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I. INTRODUCTION
Homosexuals are one of the most reviled minority groups in the Unit-
ed States.' They are victims of "hate" crimes more often than any other
group.2 With this reality as a backdrop, the United States Supreme
Court first confronted the issue of homosexuality and its relation to the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution' in Romer v.
Evans.
4
On October 10, 1995, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on the politically and socially sensitive issue of homosexual
equality in the case of Romer v. Evans.6 The Court handed down its
decision on May 20, 1996, and the opinion's implications are wide, yet
not totally settled.' The decision may affect government policy regard-
ing political equality,' same sex marriages,8 homosexuals in the mill-
1. Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homoseruals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV.
C.R-C.L L REv. 387, 410-19 (1994).
Attacks against lesbians and gay men because of their homosexuality tend to
be motivated by such extreme hatred that these incidents are unusually
bloody or gruesome. According to one sociological study, "[a]n intense rage is
present in nearly all homicide cases involving gay male victims. A striing
feature ... is their gruesome, often vicious nature. Seldom is the homosex-
ual victim simply shot. He is more apt to be stabbed a dozen or more times,
mutilated and stranged."
Id. at 410-11 (quoting Brian Miller & Laud Humphreys, Lifestyles and Violence: Ho-
mosexual Victims of Assault and Murder, 3 QUxrATIvE Soc. 169, 179 (1980)).
2. Brief for Respondents at 5 n.4, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No.
94-1039).
3. The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONSr. amend XIV, § 1.
4. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-96 (1986)
(addressing for the first time the issue whether consensual homosexual sodomy is a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause).
5. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1620 (U.S. Oral Arg.,
Oct. 10, 1995) (No. 94-1039), available in 1995 WL 605822.
6. See Daniel A. Batterman, Comment, Evans v. Romer: The Political Process,
Levels of Generality, and Perceived Ident'fiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29
NEw ENG. L REv. 915, 920 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1623.
tary,9 security clearance for government employees based upon sexual
orientation,"0 and immigration. 1 This Note analyzes the Supreme
Court's decision in Romer. Part II discusses the Equal Protection
Clause, judicial standards of review, and relevant landmark decisions
which impact homosexuals' quest for constitutional protection.12 Part
Il discusses the barriers the Supreme Court has developed against
using the Due Process Clause as an effective method of challenging
legislation disfavoring homosexuals. 3 Part IV analyzes the history of
Amendment 2' and the Court's majority and dissenting opinion in
Romer." Finally, Part V analyzes the possible impact of Romer on the
future of gay rights.16
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND
THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Equal Protection Clause appears in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution. 7 Enacted after the Civil War, the Supreme Court
originally gave the Equal Protection Clause a narrow interpretation and
applied the Clause only to the states."s Over time, the Court expanded
its interpretation of the Clause and applied the Fourteenth Amendment
8. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that denial of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates the Hawaii Constitution's prohibition of
gender-based discrimination).
9. Compare Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479-80
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the government has no rational basis for discharging gay
military personnel based upon statement of homosexuality alone), and Cammermeyer
v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 920 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding no rational basis for an
acknowledgement of homosexual orientation as evidence of a desire or propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct), with Philips v. Perry, 883 F. Supp. 539, 545-46 (W.D.
Wash. 1995) (holding that homosexual acts are not protected by an equal protection
analysis).
10. See generally Anthony W. Swisher, Nobody's Hero: On Equal Protection, Homo-
sexuality, and National Security, 62 GEo. WASIL .REv. 827 (1994) (arguing statutes
covering employees based upon stereotypes and prejudice lack support under a ratio-
nal basis analysis and therefore should be stricken as unconstitutional).
11. See generally Brian F. Henes, Comment, The Origin and Consequences of Rec-
ognizing Homosexuals as a "Particular Social Group" for Rfugee Purposes, 8 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. LJ. 377 (1994) (discussing attempts by homosexual aliens to attain
asylum in the United States by claiming membership in a particular social group).
12. See infni notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
13. See infta notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
14. See ifura notes 58-250 and accompanying text.
15. See infria notes 251-335.
16. See infta notes 336-73 and accompanying text
17. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 3 for text of the Clause.
18. See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 9
In asserting an Equal Protection claim against a statute or govern-
ment regulation, a challenger must first show an invidious classifica-
tion.? Nex the Court chooses between three standards of review to
guide its decision on the case.2' The Court begins with the lowest stan-
dard of review which assumes that legislation is valid if it is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest There are only two scenarios in
which a government regulation will be evaluated under a heightened
standard: when it infringes on a fundamental right or when it targets
a suspect classification' In order to survive the Court's inquiry under
the more rigorous "strict scrutiny" test, the government must show that
the law advances a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to
meet that interest.' An intermediate standard is used occasionally,
19. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The text of the Fourteenth
Amendment makes it applicable only to the states. U.S. CONST. Amend XIV. The Fifth
Amendment reads in pertinent part "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[T]he con-
cepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal
of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
20. Thomas E. Baker, Can Voters Exclude Homosexuals and Their Interests from
the Legislative Process?, 1 PREviEW U.S. SuP. CT. CAS. 11, 13 (1995).
21. Seth Hilton, Comment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation. Is There
a Pundamental Right to Participate in the Political Process?, 28 U.C. DAvis L REV.
445, 450 (1995).
22. Richard F. Duncan & Gary L Young, Homosexual Rights and Citizen Initia-
tives: Is Constitutionalism Constitutional?, 9 NOaE DAME J.L ETmCS & PuB. PoLY
93, 98 (1995). The Supreme Court will declare legislation invalid using this "rational
basis" test only on extremely rare occasions. But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Cir., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding under rational basis test that a city may not
deny a special use permit to the mentally retarded for operation of a group home).
"The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is
so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrationaL" Id. at 446.
23. See Zablocld v. Redhal, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (holding that marriage is a
fundamental right that must be analyzed under a heightened standard). Most of these
fundamental rights are found in the Constitution's Bill of Rights. Baker, supra note
20, at 14.
24. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that laws preventing mar-
riage between black and white citizens violate the Equal Protection Clause because
race is a suspect classification). "At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause de-
mands that racial classifications ... be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny.'" Id. at
11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
25. Hilton, supra note 21, at 451. The Supreme Court has only allowed government
activities to survive strict scrutiny when two fundamental rights collide or when the
usually when a quasi-suspect class' is involved.17 To survive this in-
termediate level scrutiny, regulations of a quasi-suspect class must have
a substantial relationship to an important government objective.s
The Supreme Court has identified several factors for determining
whether a particular class of people constitute a suspect class.' Class
members must have an immutable characteristic, be politically power-
less, and have suffered from a history of discrimination.? Homosexual-
ity usually fails this test by failing to establish an immutable character-
istic.3  When analyzing immutability, most have considered homosexu-
ality strictly an issue of conduct that does not involve any irrepressible
internal identification and understandings of self.' In addition to the
inability to clear the immutability hurdle, homosexuals have also expe-
rienced difficulty satisfying the politically powerless prong of the sus-
pect class test.' As a result of these problems, the Supreme Court has
refused to declare homosexuals a suspect class.' The Court has de-
country is at war. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct 1846 (1992) (holding that
political campaigning may be restricted within 100 feet of a polling station);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that Japanese Americans
may be placed in internment camps during World War I1). There is an indication that
the wartime exception to strict scrutiny is no longer available. See City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority in striking down an affirmative action plan, stated that "[t]he history
of racial classification in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legisla-
tive or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection anal-
ysis." Id. at 501 (citing Kommatsu, 323 U.S. at 235-40).
26. Kg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (using intermediate level scrutiny in
gender classification case).
27. Hilton, supra note 21, at 452.
28. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion).
29. Duncan & Young, supra note 22, at 98-100.
30. Pamela Coukos, Civil Rights and Special Wrongs-The Amendment 2 Litiga-
tion, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 581, 588 (1994).
31. Kenneth S. McLaughlin, Jr., Note, Challenging the Constitutionality of Presi-
dent Clinton's Compromise: A Practical Alternative to the Military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" Po/icy, 28 J. MARSHALL L REv. 179, 191-92 n.84 (1994). In addition, some
courts have observed that homosexuals are not politically powerless. See, e.g., Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that "[i]n these times
homosexuals are proving that they are not without growing political power").
32. Mclaughlin, supra note 31, at 191 n.84.
33. Id. at n.85.
34. Hilton, supra note 21, at 469; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (5-4
decision). Justice Brennan has come the closest to declaring that the Court should
consider homosexuals a suspect class. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist,
470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's
population. Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifest-
ed against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this group
[VoL 24: 991, 19971 Rome v. Evans
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clared race,'M gender,'M alienage, 7 and illegitimacy' either suspect
or quasi-suspect classifications which trigger the heightened form of
judicial scrutiny.'
Hl. THE ELIMINATION OF THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia make sodomy be-
tween consenting adults a crime.' This number is significantly fewer
than in 1961, when every state banned sodomy.4' The acts which de-
fine sodomy and the punishment for commission of these acts vary
between jurisdictions.' These laws have "ancient roots,"' and reli-
gious and cultural notions of morality are the foundation upon which
they stand."
In the 1982 case Bowers v. Hardwick,' police arrested Michael
Hardwick in the bedroom of his home and charged him with engaging
in homosexual sodomy in violation of Georgia's criminal sodomy stat-
are particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena.
Moreover, homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and
sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against homosexu-
als is "likely... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather tan... rationality."
Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting) -(footnote omitted) (quoting Plyer v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)).
35. Palmore v. Sidotl, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
36. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
37. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1984); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371-72 (1971).
38. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274-76 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-
67 (1971).
39. Hilton, supra note 21, at 450-51.
40. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 9 (Harvard Law Review ed., 1990)
[hereinafter SEXUAL ORIENTATION].
41. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 nn.5-6 (1986).
42. Id. at 198 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring); SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 40, at
10.
43. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
44. See id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Decisions of individuals relating to
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Chris-
tian moral and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under
Roman Law."); Arthur A. Murphy et al., Gays in the Military: What About Morality,
Ethics, Character and Honor?, 99 Dcg. L REV. 331, 334-36, 343 (1995).
45. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
ute.4 Hardwick filed suit, stating that Georgia's law placed him in "im-
minent danger of arrest" and arguing that the sodomy law was uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process Clause.47 The Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's decision to grant the government's motion to
dismiss.' The reversing court held that Georgia's anti-sodomy law was
unconstitutional on the basis of several Supreme Court decisions which
had recognized an implied right of privacy under the Due Process
Clause.'
The case reached the Supreme Court, and in a five-to-four decision
the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit' The Court held that the Due
Process Clause protects rights not explicitly mentioned in the text of
the Constitution if those rights are "'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were
sacrificed.'"51 The Court ruled that homosexual activity differed from
the activity protected in other privacy cases because "[n]o connection
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homo-
sexual activity on the other [had] been demonstrated."' In response to
the Court's holding, the dissent observed,
[tIhe fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours,
46. Id, at 187-88.
47. Id. at 188-89. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides: "[N]o
State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.
49. Id. The Supreme Court has held that a right of privacy protects "an intimate
relation[ship]" within the context of the family. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965) (alteration in original). Thus, the Court has held marriage itself to be a
fundamental right. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). This right to privacy also
extends to procreation and certain family rights which are "fundamental" Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
50. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
51. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). The
Court also described these Implied rights as those "'deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition.'" Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)).
52. Id. at 191. The Court rejected the argument that there is an implied right to
engage in homosexual activity because regulation of these private acts would offend
justice. Id. at 192. The Court emphasized that many states have regulated this con-
duct for most of American history. Id. at 192-94. The Court also reasoned that be-
cause a majority of Americans approve of such regulations, it cannot be extremely
offensive to notions of justice. Id. at 196 ("[R]espondent ... insists that majority
sentiments about morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not
agree ... ."). In his dissent, Justice Stevens countered the majority's argument by
stating that simply because "the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law pro-
hibiting the practice." Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that there may be many 'right' ways of conducting those relationships, and that
much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual
has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.w
Romer marks the first time the Court has addressed the constitutional
rights of homosexuals since the Bowers decision.5
Bowers effectively eliminated the ability of homosexuals to use the
Due Process Clause to gain constitutional protection against unfavorable
legislation.' In Bowers, the Court's opinion rested entirely upon the
Due Process Clause, a reliance which distressed the dissenters.' As a
result, the Equal Protection Clause is the last constitutional path upon
which to travel in order to protect homosexuas.6 7
IV. HOMOSEXUALS AND THE POUTCAL PROCESS: EVANS v. ROMER
A. History of Amendment 2
The latest challenge confronting those seeking greater legal protection
for gays and lesbians is the citizen initiative to state constitutions which
seeks to deny homosexuals governmental protection of any kind.' In at
least ten states, voters have attempted to secure constitutional
amendments of this type.' Although some of these efforts have
failed,'M the 1992 effort in Colorado succeeded."1 Colorado voters
53. Id, at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Baker, supra note 20, at 11.
55. Duncan & Young, supra note 22, at 95.
56. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201-03 ("The Court's cramped reading of the issue
before it makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a persuasive one.")
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. See Bobbi Bernstein, Note, Power, Prjudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigat-
ing "Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REV. 269, 271 (1995)
(arguing for a new approach to legal protection for gays under the Equal Protection
Clause). Although unlikely, since six of the Justices ruling in Bowers have left the
Court, a Due Process challenge may succeed in the future. Baker, supra note 20, at
11.
58. Batterman, supra note 6, at 916-20.
59. See Baker, supra note 20, at 12.
60. Christopher B. Daly, Maine: Diverse Coalition Defeats Anti-Gay Rights Mea-
sure, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 9, 1995, at A28 (discussing the defeat of a proposed amend-
ment to the Maine Constitution which would have denied the government the ability
to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination). Daly observed that "Itihe text of
the referendum question never mentioned homosexuality or gay rights. Instead, it
attempted to limit categories entitled to protection under the Maine Human Rights
Act to race, sex, physical or mental disability, religion, age, ancestry, national origin,
passed what became known as Amendment 2 on November 3, 1992, by a
vote of 53.4% to 46.692 Amendment 2 stated:
[Nleither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby ho-
mosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status,[j] quota preferences, protected status or claim
of discrimination
Amendment 2 would have effectively eliminated protection for gay and
lesbian citizens which existed in the Colorado cities of Aspen, Boulder,
and Denver."
The campaign for passage of Amendment 2 centered on the key issue
of whether laws against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
provide "special rights" or "equal rights" for homosexuals.' Explaining
what is meant by special rights is a difficult task. One easily understood
explanation maintains that the rights involved are "special" because they
grant rights to homosexuals which heterosexuals do not enjoy.'
Looking at the laws in Romer on their face make it apparent that this
explanation is not valid. 7 The laws adopted by various Colorado cities
grant freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
rather than on the basis of homosexual orientation s A second potential
explanation of special rights is that homosexuals will use the laws pri-
marily for protection, even though the laws are facially neutral While
homosexuals may be more likely than heterosexuals to seek protection
under such laws, homosexuals also are more likely to be victims of dis-
crimination.7 Although homosexuals are regularly discriminated against
and forced to seek protection under antidiscrimination laws, the laws do
not grant homosexuals any special rights denied to other groups.7 The
difficulty in supporting the argument that protection for homosexuals
equals special rights may be evidence that the term was developed more
family status and marital status." Id.
61. See Batterman, supra note 6, at 918.
62. Id.
63. See Baker, supra note 20, at 12.
64. See Batterman, supra note 6, at 918-19.
65. Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian
and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICs & PUB. PoL'Y 137, 138-39 (1995).
66. Id. at 140.
67. Id. at 140-41.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 142-43.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 143.
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for its political appeal and effect than based upon sound legal reason-
ing72
In Colorado, the groups arguing that laws and ordinances banning
discrimination created special rights were victorious at the ballot box.7y
It took only nine days, however, for opponents of Amendment 2 to file a
legal challenge asking a district court to grant a preliminary injunction
and declare the amendment unconstitutional.74 The plaintiffs argued that
Amendment 2 violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and under other provisions of both the Colo-
rado and United States Constitutions.' The defendants in the suit, in-
cluding the Governor and Attorney General of Colorado, argued that
Amendment 2 did not violate any constitutional provisions and that it
only ordained a "'statewide policy of governmental neutrality with re-
spect to sexual orientation.'"'6 On January 15, 1993, the district court
granted plaintiffs' request and issued a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the amendment pending a determination of its constitu-
tionality." The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed this injunction on
July 19, 1993. 7
After the passage of Amendment 2, a national boycott of Colorado was
undertaken which, coupled with a decline in tourism, may have cost the
state $120 million in lost revenue.m Yet Amendment 2 had other, more
substantial costs.' Hate crimes increased by as much as 800% following
72. Id. at 147 n.24. The group Colorado for Family Values (CFV), which worked
closely on the campaign with the Reverend Pat Robertson's National Legal Founda-
tion, prepared the text of Amendment 2. Stephanie L Grauerholz, Comment,
Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated. The Emerence of a Ptndamental Right to Par-
ticipate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAUL L REV. 841, 84647 (1995). CFVs stated
mission is essentially to protect people from "the forced affirmation of the homosexu-
al lifestyle." Id. at 847. In its campaign for the Amendment, CFV argued that homo-
sexuals were undermining families, molesting children, and overcrowding hospitals as
a result of sexually transmitted diseases. Id. at 848.
73. Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 844. Voters passed Amendment 2 by a margin of
813,966 to 710,151. Id.
74. Id. at 845. A group of homosexual Coloradans and one heterosexual man suf-
fering from AIDS filed the legal challenge on November 12, 1992. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 845-46 (citing Evans v. Romer, 60 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,998
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993), offd on other grounds, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)).
77. Id. at 846.
78. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1270.
79. Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 851.
80. See Batterman, supra note 6, at 941-43.
its passage, which is consistent with the effect of anti-gay rights cam-
paigning in other states." During a similar debate in Oregon, a lesbian
and gay newspaper in Portland received a note which read: "After 9 pass-
es we will kill you all.' In addition to an increase in physical violence,
the passage of Amendment 2 led to movements in all fifty states to enact
anti-gay rights legislation" Gay rights organizations, however, mobilized
by promoting education drives and other activities designed to combat
the stereotypes and myths about homosexuals advanced by anti-gay
rights activists." Opponents of measures such as Amendment 2, with
the support of groups such as the National Education Association, the
Colorado Bar Association, and the American Psychological Association,
worked to counter beliefs that homosexuality is a chosen behavior and
that homosexuals are more likely to be child molesters than heterosexu-
als.' Ultimately, the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court served to
quiet many of these arguments.'
B. The Supreme Court of Colorad's Majority Opinion
The Colorado Supreme Court advanced a controversial position when
it declared that the Constitution of the United States guarantees, through
the Equal Protection Clause, "the fundamental right to participate equally
in the political process and that any attempt to infringe on an indepen-
dently identifiable group's ability to exercise that right is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny."' As the dissent correctly outlined, the Supreme Court
has often refused to "expand the list of fundamental constitutional
rights."' The Evans court included the right to equal participation in
the political process on this list by taking a broad, generalized view of
earlier Court decisions.' The hostility which some Supreme Court Jus-
tices, including Justice Scalia, have expressed for broad interpretation of
previous decisions exemplifies the controversial nature of this deci-
sion.' Justice Scalia has maintained that when choosing how broadly or
narrowly to view a decision, the Court "'refer[s] to the most specific
81. Id. at 942 n.187-89.
82. Id. at 939 n189 (quoting Heather Rhoads, Cruel Crusade: The Holy War
Against Lesbians and Gays, PROGREssiVE, Mar. 1993, at 21).
83. Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 851 (citing Michael Booth & Steven Wfnmson,
The Great Divide: Basic Values at Heart of Debate, DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1993, at
10).
84, Id. at 851-52.
85. Id. at 849-51.
86. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
87. Id. at 1276.
88. Id. at 1291 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
89. See Batterman, supra note 6, at 945-46.
90. Id. at 952-53.
1000
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level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified.'"" In the case of Amendment 2, the
Evans court took a more expansive view of the Court's earlier cases
dealing with access to the political process.'6 The court dispensed with
the idea that the Equal Protection Clause applies only to suspect classes
of persons and then began a long discussion of four types of cases: (1)
right to vote, (2) reapportionment, (3) access to the ballot, and finally (4)
cases which limit an identifiable group's ability to influence legislation
because of ballot initiatives.'
1. Right to Vote Cases
"The right of citizens to participate in the process of government is a
core democratic value which has been recognized from the very incep-
tion of our Republic up to the present time.' The Evans court began
weaving its support for a fundamental right to participate in the political
process guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause by visiting Supreme
Court decisions addressing the right of citizens to vote.9 The court cit-
ed cases such as Dunn v. Blumstein, Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,' and Kramer v. Union Free School Distric to support its
91. Id. at 952 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added)).
92. Id. at 953-55. Instead of looldng at Supreme Court precedent in terms of the
narrow subject matter of each case, the Evans court tied several decisions together
and determined that no group should be denied the right to fully participate in the
world of representative democracy and public policy. Id. at 947-48.
93. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1275-86. Specifically, the court stated that "gay men, les-
bians, and bisexuals have not been found to constitute a suspect class,.. . and that
plaintiffs do not claim that they constitute such a class do[es] not render the Equal
Protection Clause inapplicable to them." Id. at 1275 (internal citations omitted).
94. Id. at 1276.
95. Id. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
each expand and protect the citizens' freedom to vote, evincing the importance of the
right to vote found in the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (ban-
ning race-based restrictions on the right to vote); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (banning
restrictions based on gender); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (prohibiting poll taxes);
U.S. CONSr. amend. XXVI, § 1 (granting voting rights to persons 18 years old and
older).
96. 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (striling down voter residency requirements).
97. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (maldng poll taxes illegal).
98. 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (banning property ownership and parental status as
voting requirements).
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position that the right to political participation is fundamental.1 The
Court in Dunn specifically stated, "In decision after decision, this Court
has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the ju-
risdiction."' ° In each of these cases, the Supreme Court applied the
strict scrutiny test and concluded that the laws were unconstitution-
aL101
2. Reapportionment Cases
The Evans court next added Supreme Court cases concerning appor-
tionment of representation to its discussion of equal participation in the
political process."° The court first considered Reynolds v. Sims." In
Reynolds, the Court held that the Alabama legislature must allow each
citizen's vote to have an equal impact upon an election by apportioning
seats in the Alabama legislature according to population."° The Court
said that "[no right is more precious in a free country than that of hav-
ing a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live.... Our Constitution leaves no room for
classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this
right.'"" The Evans court adopted this idea and stated:
[TIhe Court's opinion in Reynolds, as well as in the other reapportionment cases,
reflects the judgment that dilution in the effectiveness of certain voters' exercise
of the franchise violates the guarantee of equal protection of the laws not simply
because citizens are guaranteed the right to vote, but because that right must be
preserved in a meaningful, effective manner."M
The apportionment line of cases established the "one man, one vote"
principle and expanded the Court's perspective on the importance of
fairness and equality in the political process."°7
3. Access to the Ballot Cases
The Evans court next turned its attention to the Supreme Court's deci-
sions regarding candidate and party eligibility." The court discussed
99. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1276-77.
100. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336.
101. Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 865.
102. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277.
103. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
104. Id. at, 568.
105. Id. at 560 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964)).
106. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
107. See Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 868.
108. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
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Williams v. Rhodes,'O' which overturned an Ohio law that greatly re-
stricted access to the presidential ballot, and Illinois State Board of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,0 in which the Court invalidated
an Illinois law disfavoring minority parties in local elections.' The
court noted that the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to these cases
because the laws "placed significant burdens on 'the right of qualified
voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effec-
tively.'""
2
Although these three types of cases were important to the Evans
court's determination that the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed a
fundamental right to equal participation in the political process, the court
found the final category the most instructive."'
4. Ballot Initiatives Disadvantaging a Particular Group
The Evans court correctly identified a group of cases more closely
paralleling the case at bar than the cases previously discussed."4 Begin-
ning with Hunter v. Erickson,"' the court detailed Supreme Court deci-
sions which strongly suggested the unconstitutionality of ballot initiatives
limiting a particular group's political participation." In Hunter, Ohio
voters passed an amendment to the Akron City Charter requiring the
voters to enact any fair housing ordinances while permitting the city
council to enact all other ordinances."7 The plaintiffs claimed that the
amendment discriminated against them because of their race and made it
more difficult for them to secure favorable legislation."8 The Supreme
Court held that the amendment violated the Equal Protection rights of
African-Americans because it subjected them to a disadvantage in the po-
litical arena"' "[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it
may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation
109. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
110. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
111. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278.
112. Id. (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 31).
113. Id. at 1278-79.
114. See id. at 1278-84.
115. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
116. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279.
117. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.
118. Id. at 386-89.
119. See id. at 393.
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than another of comparable size."" Although the plaintiff in the case
was black, the Evans court stated that the "opinion speaks to concerns
which are broader than the repugnancy of racial discrimination
alone.""' In support of this contention, the court pointed out that if
Hunter was concerned with only racial discrimination, the Court could
have dispensed with it on the grounds that it adversely impacted a sus-
pect class and avoided a detailed discussion on the "importance of po-
litical participation."" As additional support for its contention that the
Hunter Court intended its decision to be generally applicable and not
confined to race cases, the court noted that the Supreme Court did not
cite to any race cases to support its decision."2
Next, the court looked at Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1 .i2 In Seattle School District, the Supreme Court struck down a
voter initiative which would have forbidden local school districts from
requiring student busing for purposes of integration."2 The Court relied
upon its decision in Hunter and fully adopted the principle of neutrality
that Justice Harlan discussed in his concurring opinion in Hunter."
The Court held that the initiative was unconstitutional because it was not
based upon "neutral principles.""2 The Court explained that only neu-
tral regulations would be free from Equal Protection attack, stating that
"[b]ecause such [neutral] laws make it more difficult for every group in
the community to enact comparable laws, they 'provid[e] a just frame-
work within which the diverse political groups in our society may fairly
compete.'""2M Based on the Supreme Court's adoption of the rule of neu-
tral principles, the Evans court concluded that these cases were not
limited to a racial context; rather, a court should apply the neutral princi-
ple whenever an identifiable group is not given equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the political process."2 "Thus, while Hunter and [Seattle
School District were] indeed cases which involved racial minorities, the
principle articulated in those cases clearly [was] not one that [could] log-
ically be limited to the 'race' context alone." "8°
120. Id.
121. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279.
122. Id. at 1283.
123. Id. at 1279-80.
124. 458 U.S. 457, 459-67 (1982).
125. Id. at 459-67.
126. Id. at 469-70; see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
127. Seattle Sch. Dist, 458 U.S. at 469-70.
128. Id. at 470 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393).
129. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1281 (Colo. 1993).
130. Id.
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As further support for the proposition that these cases were not based
on race, the Evans court analyzed Gordon v. Lance."' In Gordon, the
Supreme Court upheld a section of the West Virginia Constitution which
required a voter referendum approved by sixty percent of the voters in
order for the State or one of its subdivisions to incur bonded indebted-
ness." The Court stated, "We conclude that so long as such provisions
do not discriminate against or authorize discrimination against any iden-
t'fiable class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause." " The
Court could not identify any "independently identifiable group or catego-
ry" which was discriminated against by this section of the West Virginia
Constitution and thus found that it did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause." The Evans court reasoned that because the Court in Gordon,
which did not involve race, cited to Hunter, which did involve racial
minorities, the identifiable groups to which the Supreme Court referred
was not limited to race1  The Evans court pointed out that the reason
for upholding the West Virginia provision while striking down the two
previous provisions was that in Gordon, there was no identifiable group
while in Hunter and Seattle School District, such a group existed.'"
The court used these four types of cases, with particular emphasis on
the final category, to conclude that the Supreme Court had recognized a
fundamental right to equal participation in the political process and thus,
courts must subject any law which limits participation of an identifiable
group to strict scrutiny.m The Evans court stated:
[Tihe Court consistently recognized the paramount Importance of political par-
ticipation in our system of government, and articulated the fundamental principle
which guided its decision in those cases: The Equal Protection Clause guarantees
the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process and thus, any
attempt to infringe on that right must be subject to strict scrutiny and can be held
constitutionally valid only if supported by a compelling state interestL
131. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 5.
135. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1279 (footnote omitted).
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C. The Dissent of Colorado Supreme Court Justice Erickson
Justice Erickson was the only dissenter in Evans." He analyzed the
rationale of the district court's original preliminary injunction'" and the
rationale of the majority and determined that no right to equal participa-
tion in the political process existed."" The dissent rejected the notion
that voter rights and ballot access cases stand for any principle beyond
those expressly stated by the Court.
After a brief discussion of the voter cases, the dissent turned its atten-
tion to cases which have discussed changing the political structure of a
state to the disadvantage of a particular group of persons.'" The dis-
sent reasoned that Hunter and Seattle School District, both cited by the
majority,'" were nothing more than traditional racial classification cas-
es.l" The dissent quoted extensively from portions of Hunter in which
the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of plaintiffs membership
in a racial minority group.1" According to the dissent, Seattle School
District was also a simple racial case.'47 The dissent dismissed Gordon
v. Lance," a case upholding a contended regulation, as distinguishable
from Hunter in which "the group challenging the constitutional measure
could not establish membership in a discrete and insular minority that
the Supreme Court recognized as a suspect classification."49
The major support for the dissent's contention that the Supreme Court
did not intend to establish a generalized right to equal participation in
the political process came from James v. Valtierra. ° In James, the Su-
preme Court upheld a voter-initiated amendment to the California Consti-
139. Id. at 1286 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
140. Romer v. Evans, 60 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 41,998 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15,
1993), offd on other grounds, 854 P.2d at 1270. The district court based its decision
to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of Amendment 2 on a fundamental right to not
have the government give effect to private biases. Id.
141. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1302 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1294 (Erickson, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no ... common thread unit-
ing the decisions cited by the majority.").
143. Id. at 1296-97 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
144. Id, at 1279-81.
145. Id. at 1297-1300 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1297 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1300 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
148. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
149. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1299 (Erickson, J., dissenting). The dissent did not explain
the Gordon Court's curious language that it could "discern no independently identifi-
able group or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of fi-
nancing." See Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5. If the Court had intended to contrast Gordon
with Hunter on a racial basis alone, it could have pointed out that the bond indebt-
edness amendment did not impact a suspect classification of persons. See id.
150. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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tution which would have forbidden municipalities from building or ac-
quiring public housing projects without a voter-approved referendum.5
The Court said that "a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a partic-
ular group does not always deny equal protection. Under any such hold-
ing, presumably a State would not be able to require referendums on any
subject unless referendums were required on all, because they would
always disadvantage some group."" The Evans dissent argued that if
the Court had intended to protect "any identifiable group," as the major-
ity argued, it would have struck down the California amendment because
it disadvantages poor citizens who benefit from low-income housing."
For these reasons, the dissent concluded that "[t]o date... the Su-
preme Court has never explicitly stated that a fundamental right to par-
ticipate equally in the political process exists.""5 In rejecting the argu-
ments of Amendment 2 opponents, the dissent stated that "rather than
expressing a willingness to extrapolate new fundamental rights based on
selective language from prior Supreme Court decisions, we should exer-
cise caution in identifying and embracing previously unrecognized funda-
mental rights."'1
D. Events Following Evans v. Romer
After the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's granting
of the injunction and dictated a strict scrutiny standard of review, the
case returned to the lower court for a determination of whether Colora-
do had a compelling state interest and if Amendment 2 was narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest." The State argued that it had six com-
pelling reasons to justify Amendment 22" These included: (1) deterring
factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's political functions;
(3) preserving the ability of the State to remedy discrimination against
suspect classes; (4) preventing the government from interfering with
personal, familial, and religious privacy; (5) preventing government from
subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group; and (6)
151. Id. at 140-41.
152. Id. at 142.
153. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1297-98 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1301 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting).
156. Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 754 (Colo. Dist Ct Dec.
14, 1993), ofd, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), offd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996).
157. See id. at 755-62.
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promoting the physical and psychological well-being of children."" The
lower court concluded that only the promotion of religious and familial
privacy were compelling state interests and that Amendment 2, as it
related to those objectives, was not sufficiently narrow to pass constitu-
tional requirements." The plaintiffs again appealed this decision to the
Colorado Supreme Court and the court delivered an opinion on October
11, 1994.1' The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's de-
cision that the State had not met its burden of showing it had a com-
pelling state interest or that the Amendment was narrowly tailored to the
State's interest, and thus, Amendment 2 could not stand.''
E. To the Supreme Court of the United States
On February 21, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted
Petitioners' writ of certiorari.L" The Court heard oral arguments on Oc-
tober 10, 1995."
1. Brief for Petitioners
Petitioners'" began their argument by labeling the decision of the
Colorado Supreme Court as one which "embodies a revolutionary change
in the structure of state and local political authority" and "does profound
violence to settled understandings of the authority of, and respect for,
popular government at the state level."" This concern over federal in-
terference in the internal political decision-making process of the State
158. Id. at 755.
159. Id. at 759.
160. See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1335.
161. Id. at 1350. Although religious and familial privacy were compelling government
interests, the court concluded that Amendment 2 was not narrowly tailored to
achieve these goals. Id. at 1344 ("[Flully recognizing that parents have a 'privacy'
right to instruct their children that homosexuality is immoral, we find that nothing in
the laws or policies which Amendment 2 is intended to prohibit interferes with that
right").
162. Romer v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
163. Transcript of Oral Argument, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039), available in 1995 WL 605822, at *1 (Oct. 10, 1995).
164. Many anticus briefs were filed in support of the Petitioners, including Joint
Brief of the States of Alabama, California, Idaho, Nebraska, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Virginia; Joint Brief of the Christian Legal Society, Catholic League for
Religious and Civil Rights, Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Conven-
tion, Focus on the Family, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, National Association of
Evangelicals; and Family Research Council; Joint Brief of the Oregon Citizens Alli-
ance, No Special Rights Committee, and Stop Special Rights-PAC; and Amicus Brief
of the Pacific Legal Foundation. Baker, supra note 20, at 17-18.
165. Brief for Petitioners at 10, Romer (No. 94-1039).
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of Colorado constituted the primary argument for overturning the lower
court ruling." Petitioners pointed to Luther v. Borden' and San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, among other cases,
as support for their position that a state may organize its internal polit-
ical functions as it chooses." Indeed, Petitioners pointed to authority
which indicates that even when a suspect or quasi-suspect class is af-
fected by the self-governing process within a state, strict scrutiny is not
necessarily triggered."7 Petitioners urged the Court not to interfere
with Colorado's internal decision making process and noted that the
Court has traditionally given states "'extraordinarily wide latitude'" to
structure themselves politically.17'
Next, Petitioners argued that Amendment 2 did not involve a suspect
or quasi-suspect class." Respondents did not preserve the issue for Su-
preme Court review, and both the district court and the Colorado Su-
preme Court acknowledged that homosexuals were not considered a
suspect class for constitutional purposes." Therefore, strict scrutiny
would apply to the Equal Protection claim only if Romer involved a "fed-
erally-guaranteed fundamental right""
Petitioners asserted that "[t]he 'right' of every independently identifi-
able group to fully participate in all phases of the political process identi-
fied by the Colorado Supreme Court has no basis in the text of the Con-
stitution."" Petitioners buttressed this position by arguing that the cas-
es relied upon by the majority in Evans, such as Hunter v. Erickson76
and Washington v. Seattle School District,' did not create a funda-
mental right but instead protected a suspect class.Th In addition to at-
166. Id, at 14-16.
167. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
168. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
169. Brief for Petitioners at 14-15, Romer (No. 94-1039).
170. Id. at 15 n.6.
171. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Holt Civil Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71
(1978)).
172. Id. at 16-18.
173. Id. at 16-17.
174. Id. at 18.
175. Id. at 19.
176. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
177. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
178. Brief for Petitioners at 20-24, Romer (No. 94-1039). This is the precise position
taken by the dissent in the lower court opinion, illuminating the difficulty in inter-
preting two Supreme Court decisions which do not carefully delineate the line be-
tween suspect classifications and fundamental rights. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d
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tacking the lower court's reading of these two cases as having "turn[ed]
the opinion in Hunter on its head,""7 petitioners cited to James v.
Valtierra.8"O Petitioners pointed out that James concerned an amend-
ment to the California Constitution which would have required voter
approval of municipal purchases or acquisitions of low-income hous-
ing."" The Court upheld the amendment and indicated its decision did
not conflict with Hunter because unlike Hunter, James did not involve
racial issues.' Petitioners used this line of reasoning as proof that the
opinions relied upon by the Evans court were suspect class cases and
could not be read to create a new fundamental right s Finally, Peti-
tioners claimed that the majority "rewrote" James using "mystifying" log-
ic" and insisted that "the Hunter rule comes into play only to protect
racial minorities--or at its most expansive, members of a suspect
class. -ls5
Petitioners next addressed the other types of cases upon which the
Evans court relied.18 After discussing the right to vote and ballot ac-
cess cases, Petitioners asserted that these cases do not stand for any-
thing beyond the issue presented to the Court.' Furthermore, "[r]ather
than burdening any person's rights to vote or associate, Amendment 2
simply raises a certain issue to a constitutional level." " Petitioners
concluded by asserting that voter and ballot access cases not only failed
to support the Evans court's conclusion, but instead stand for the propo-
sition that "[sItates are completely free to structure their governmental
decision making authority without judicial interference." "
1270, 1286-1302 (Colo. 1993) (Erickson, J., dissenting).
179. Brief for Petitioners at 20, Romer (No. 94-1039).
180. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
181. Brief for Petitioners at 21, Romer (No. 94-1039).
182. James, 402 U.S. at 141.
183. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Romer (No. 94-1039).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 24.
186. Id. at 25 (noting that the Evans court also relied on Reynolds v. Simms, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), and Kramer v. Union Frye SOL. Dist, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)).
187. Id. at 25-28. Petitioners failed to point out that the Evans court acknowledged
that these cases, when taken by themselves, do not establish the fundamental right to
participate in the political process. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo.
1993) ("When considered together, these cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection
Clause guarantees the fundamental right to participate equally in the political pro-
cess.') (emphasis added).
188. Brief for Petitioners at 27, Romer (No. 94-1039). This statement begs the ques-
tion because the court is addressing the constitutionality of raising this issue to the
state constitutional level under the assumed fundamental right to participate equally
in the political process. See generally Evans, 854 P.2d at 1270.
189. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Romer (No. 94-1039). The Petitioners also qualified
this statement by adding "absent a clearly applicable constitutional impediment." Id.
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Petitioners maintained that the Evans court fundamentally erred by
locating the right to participate equally in the political process in case
law, rather than determining whether such a right is "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.'"'" Petitioners asserted that courts
cannot find this right in the Equal Protection Clause itself; instead, the
right must be found through a historical Due Process analysis or in the
text of the Constitution. 9 Having established the framework for identi-
fying fundamental rights, Petitioners asserted that "[tlhe 'right' to demand
preferential treatment from any level of state or local government is
neither 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' nor 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.'""m Petitioners next discussed a series
of cases in which the Supreme Court deferred to a state's ability to struc-
ture itself politically.' In addition to arguing that the Court should de-
fer to the state on these issues, Petitioners maintained that allowing
every "independently identifiable group" to challenge unfavorable consti-
tutional provisions would subject a whole range of provisions to chal-
lenge." According to Petitioners, this problem is complicated by the
limitless number of groups which are independently identifiable and the
Colorado Supreme Court's failure to limit its decision only to the legal
challenge of constitutional provisions."
The Evans court concluded that such an impediment existed, making all the cases it
considered relevant under Petitioners' standard. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282
(Colo. 1993).
190. Brief for Petitioners at 28-29, Romer (No. 94-1039) (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977))) (internal quotation marks omitted in original).
191. Id at 28.
192. Id. at 30 (quotations omitted in original). Many who engage in political battles
for civil rights argue that petitioning elected representatives for protections against
discrimination is indeed deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition.
Marcosson, supra note 65, at 144-54; see also Evans, 854 P.2d at 1291 (Erickson, J.,
dissenting).
193. Brief for Petitioners at 30-33, Romer (No. 94-1039).
194. Id. at 34-38. Petitioners argued that "[any conceivable group, from a boy scout
troop to a group of tax protestors, fits the definition." Id. at 35.
195. Id, at 35. Despite Petitioners' contention that the Evans court did not limit its
decision to constitutional provisions, the decision makes it clear that a group could
not argue that they were "fenced out" of the political process when democratically
elected representatives were empowered to take notice of their voices prior to the
enactment of a statute or ordinance and were empowered to repeal such statutes or
ordinances after implementation. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1284.
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Finally, Petitioners focused on whether Amendment 2 would pass the
rational basis test.' Petitioners asserted three state interests which
they contended were rationally related to Amendment 2: (1) the integrity
of civil rights laws, (2) enhancing individual freedoms, and (3) avoiding
factionalism in the law.'97 First, Petitioners maintained that given
Colorado's financial constraints, it was rational to assume that adding
gays and lesbians to the class of suspect citizens would deplete resourc-
es and lixnit the State's ability to combat discrimination against other
protected groups."m Second, Petitioners asserted that Amendment 2
might interfere with religious, familial, personal, and associational free-
doms.1" Petitioners pointed out that churches might be required to hire
homosexuals in violation of their faith, persons may be required to rent
rooms to homosexuals in violation of personal privacy, and Amendment
2 "could undermine the efforts of some parents to teach traditional moral
values."'au Finally, Petitioners argued that "[ilt is advantageous to the
State to have uniform civil rights laws, both to promote efficient enforce-
ment, and to maximize individual liberty, including the preservation of
traditional social norms."° They maintained that having many different
municipal ordinances "seriously faqgment[edJ Colorado's body poli-
tiCe=au
196. Brief for Petitioners at 39, Romer (No. 94-1039).
197. Id. at 41-48.
198. Id. at 41-43. Petitioners implied that homosexuals do not need protection be-
cause homosexuals and bisexuals have higher than average levels of wealth and edu-
cation. Id. at 43 n.30. Petitioners did not mention the testimony of two experts, Den-
ver Mayor Wellington Webb and Anti-discrimination Compliance Officer Brenda
Tolliver-Locke, who indicated that enforcing Denver's anti-gay discrimination ordinance
does not detract from enforcing antidiscrimination laws against other groups. Evans v.
Romer, 63 Fair. Empl- Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 757 (Colo. Dist. Ct Dec. 14, 1993),
affd, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), ofJd on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Peti-
tioners also did not mention the testimony of Leanna Ware from the Civil Rights
Bureau of the State of Wisconsin who said that the percentage of claims filed by
homosexuals is very small and no adverse impact upon enforcement of other laws
has resulted. Id.
199. Brief for Petitioners at 43-48, Romer (No. 94-1039).
200. Id. at 43-46.
201. Id. at 47-48. Petitioners did not address the following comments of the trial
judge: "Defendants' own authorities encourage the 'competition of ideas' with 'unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open' political debate. Defendants seek to deter those very
things as being factionalism.' The history and policy of this country has been to en-
courage that which defendants seek to deter.' Evans, 63 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 756.
202. Brief for Petitioners at 47, Romer (No. 94-1039).
1012
[Vol. 24: 991, 1997] Romer v. Evans
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
2. Brief for Respondents
The Respondents ' brief mirrored the position of the lower court
203. Many amicus briefs were filed in support of the Respondents including. Joint
Brief of United Methodists for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Concerns, Axious USA, Inc.,
The Brethren/Mennonite Council for Lesbian and Gay Concerns, Dignity/USA, Evangeli-
cals Concerned, Inc., Integrity, Inc., Lutherans Concerned/North America, Presbyterians
for Lesbian/Gay Concerns, United Church Coalition for Lesbian/Gay Concerns, and the
World Congress of Gay and Lesbian Jewish Organizations; Joint Brief of the American
Association on Mental Retardation, American Orthopsychiatric Association, the ARC,
National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, National Association for
Rights Protection and Advocacy, American Network of Community Options and Re-
sources, The American Bar Association; and The American Federation of State, Coun-
ty, and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO; Joint Brief of the American Friends Service
Committee, American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, Federation of Re-
constructionist Congregations and Havurot, Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace,
The Most Reverend Edmond L Browning, Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church,
Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association, Unitarian Universalist Association, United
Church of Christ Office for Church in Society, and United Synagogue of Conservative
Judaism; Joint Brief of The American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, National Association of Social Workers, Inc., and the Colorado Psycho-
logical Association; Joint Brief of the Anti-Defamation League, Asian American Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Japanese American Citizens League, NAACP Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, Inc., National Council of La Raza, and the People For The
American Way and Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Joint Brief of
the Colorado Bar Association et al., and the Gay and Lesbian Lawyers of Philadel-
phia; Joint Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund, National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, National Lesbian and Gay Law Association, National Center for Lesbian
Rights, Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Gay and Lesbian Medical Associa-
tion, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, National Asian Pacific American Legal
Consortium, National Organization for Women, NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund, Inc., Gay and Lesbian Law
Association of Florida, Oregon Gay and Lesbian Law Association, Bay Area Lawyers
for Individual Freedom, Lawyers for Human Rights-the Lesbian and Gay Bar Associ-
ation of Los Angeles, Orange County Lawyers for Equality Gay and Lesbian, and the
Tom Homann Bar Association of San Diego; Joint Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund, and the Women's Legal Defense Fund, Joint Brief of the National Education
Association, the Colorado Education Association, the American Federation of Teach-
ers, AFL-CIO, American Association of University Professors, Association for Supervi-
sion of Curriculum Development, Council of the Great City Schools, and the National
Association for Chicana and Chicano Studies; Joint Brief of the States of Oregon,
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Washington, and the District of
Columbia; Joint Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B.
Kurland, and Kathleen M. Sullivan. Baker, supra note 20, at 17-18. Noticeably absent
from this list was the expected brief of the United States Department of Justice. Ann
Devroy, Clinton Backs Ban on Serual Orientation Bias at Work, WASH. POST, Oct.
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majority in Evans.' After setting forth the history of Amendment 2'
and its treatment by the Colorado Supreme Court,2w Respondents sum-
marized their argument by stating that Amendment 2 violated the rights
of homosexuals to participate equally in the political process, but did not
pass either the strict scrutiny or the rational basis test'
Respondents also challenged Petitioners' assertion that Romer involved
a federalism issue and that states should be free to structure their inter-
nal political process as they choose.'s Respondents contended that the
Supreme Court may intervene when these structures "burden a federally
protected right."'
Next, Respondents argued that the right to participate equally in the
political process is fundamental and applies to everyone, not simply to
suspect classifications.t0 In support of this position, Respondents cited
the cases used by the Evans majority.' Countering Petitioners' posi-
tion that no fundamental right to equal participation in the political pro-
cess exists for nonsuspect groups, Respondents replied that "[tihe State's
reasoning not only distorts what the Court said in those cases [cited by
the Evan's majority], but also is illogical."2 While conceding that the
cited cases involved racial classifications, Respondents argued that the
outcomes of the cases did not turn solely upon race.213
Respondents then attempted to explain what the Court intended when
Justice Harlan used the "neutral principle" approach to political restruc-
turing in Hunter v. Erickson."4 Petitioners had argued that if the neu-
tral principle approach applies to all independently identifiable groups,
not just to suspect classes, then the Court would invalidate many state
constitutional provisions."' Respondents countered the argument by
reasoning that constitutional provisions that only affect independently
identifiable groups based upon a neutral principle that may not affect
20, 1995, at A7. This omission was especially unusual in light of the Justice
Department's tradition of filing briefs in major civil rights cases and President
Clinton's stand on homosexual issues generally. Id.
204. See generaUy Brief for Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039).
205. dL at 7-8.
206. Id. at 1-3.
207. Id at 12-15.
208. Id. at 24.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 25.
211. Id. at 25-28; see supra notes 92-137 and accompanying text.
212. Brief for Respondents at 27, Romer (No. 94-1039).
213. Id. at 28.
214. Id. at 30-31 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurrmg)).
215. Id. at 31.
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other groups would not violate the Equal Protection Clause; but, those
that specifically target such groups with the intention of diminishing
their political power would violate the Equal Protection Clause.26 Re-
spondents also disputed Petitioners' argument that almost all constitu-
tional provisions discriminate against a particular identifiable group, and
therefore, Respondents' definition would require all constitutional mea-
sures to be subject to strict scrutiny.217 Respondents argued that the
group must be identified "independent" of their common position in op-
position to or support for a particular measure.2 They maintained:
The State's parade of horribles is populated by groups that it can only describe by
views on or a desire to engage in activities that some state constitutions ban gov-
ernment from regulating... .[The relevant question is whether the state constitu-
tional provision itself identifies some group with some personal trait that is inde-
pendent of the issue that the provision addresses, and gives to this group different
access to the political process as to that issue. While none of the State's examples
so identify and burden any group, this is precisely what Amendment 2 does."'
Finally, Respondents argued that Amendment 2 could not survive even
under the rational basis test.220 Respondents attacked each of
Colorado's asserted interests and charged, inter alia, that the real pur-
pose behind Amendment 2 is "to harm a politically unpopular group. " "
3. Petitioners' Reply Brief
Petitioners' Reply Brief began by reaffirming Petitioners' belief that the
entire issue was one of federalism and that the Court may not dictate the
internal decision-making process of individual states.2' They reasoned:
"All that is at issue here is whether Coloradans can divest their elected
representatives of authority to deal with a particular issue... and in-
stead insist that [a] question of public policy be resolved solely by the
people on a statewide basis.' Petitioners asserted that Respondents
were asking the Court to overturn its decision in James v. Valtierra2
216. Id, at 29-31.
217. Id. at 31-32.
218. Id. at 32.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 35-49.
221. Id. at 36.
222. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No.
94-1039).
223. Id.
224. 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding that it is not unconstitutional to require a popular
vote before allowing municipalities to acquire any public housing).
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by relying primarily upon unfounded claims that Amendment 2 could de-
prive homosexuals of services as basic as police protection.'
Petitioners asserted that the Hunter case, referred to by Respondents,
stands only for the premise that states may not structure political deci-
sion-maling processes to disadvantage racial minorities, not that the
structures may not disadvantage all identifiable groups.' Petitioners
argued that Respondents were ignoring the role that race played in
Hunter and chastised Respondents for "do[ing] nothing to explain why
James v. Valtierra... does not control this case."' They maintained
that "contrary to Respondents' position, it is no answer to declare that
the privilege of strict scrutiny is 'limited' to those groups that are 'inde-
pendently identifiable.' Certainly, the poor are as readily identifiable a
group as homosexuals and bisexuals.'
Next, Petitioners asserted that the Amendment did not shut homosexu-
als out of the political process because homosexuals could still vote and
even repeal Amendment 2.' They maintained that direct election is the
best type of democracy and that with elections "there is no need to as-
sure that the voter's views will be adequately represented through their
representatives in the legislature."'
Petitioners took issue with some of the assertions made by Respon-
dents concerning the potential consequences of Amendment 2.1 Peti-
tioners asserted that Amendment 2 had never been interpreted and that
Respondents should not rely upon "extreme hypotheticals" to invalidate
an otherwise constitutional provision.' Petitioners reiterated that ex-
tending the fundamental right to participate equally in the political pro-
cess to all identifiable groups was unreasonable and complained that
Respondents' arguments were merely a "backdoor means to acquire sus-
pect class treatment."m
225. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, 7, Romer (No. 94-1039).
226. Id. at 2-3.
227. 1& at 3.
228. Id. (footnote omitted). The Petitioners were unable to identify a group impact-
ed by the facially neutral housing amendment discussed in James which could be
grouped together without regard to their common position on the amendment See
Brief for Respondents at 31, Romer (No. 94-1039).
229. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Romer (No. 94-1039).
230. I Petitioners demonstrated that the referendum system is not as extraordinary
as Respondents contended and that in a seven-year time period numerous states pro-
posed 1001 amendments to their constitutions, and voters adopted over seventy per-
cent Id. at 4 n.7.
231. Id. at 6-7.
232. Id. at 7.
233. 1d at 11-12.
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Petitioners concluded by arguing that Amendment 2 passed the ratio-
nal basis test.' Petitioners pointed out that the trial court had found
some of the State's reasons for Amendment 2 to be not only rational but
compelling, and maintained that Coloradans did not vote for Amendment
2 simply to perpetuate hate against homosexuals.'e Petitioners argued
that Amendment 2 was simply a rational way for Coloradans to declare
that the State should not use limited resources to protect homosexuals
from discrimination.' After supporting this position with statistics indi-
cating that bias against homosexuals is not powerful in Colorado, Peti-
tioners repeated their positions on each of the asserted rational bases of
Amendment 2.237
4. The Decision
The Supreme Court decision in Romer v. Evans brought both cries of
joy' and expressions of anger.2' The Court's decision to uphold the
ultimate decision of the Colorado Supreme Courte brought immediate
reaction from politicians across the political spectrum both nationall 4
234. Id, at 14.
235. Id. at 14-20.
236. Id. at 15.
237. Id. at 15-20.
238. Suzanne Goldberg, an associate of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, a gay and lesbian legal organization, stated, "This decision will change the
course of civil rights for years to come." Tony Mauro, Decision May Shift Course of
Civil Rights Law, USA TODAY, May 21, 1996, at 1A. Matt Coles, director of the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, stated that Romer "puts
government on notice that laws based on hostility to gays and lesbians-or any other
group-will not be tolerated." David G. Savage, Supreme Court Strikes Down Law
Targeting Gays, LA. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at Al.
239. The President of the Family Research Council, Gary L. Bauer, stated that the
Court's decision "should send chills down the back of anyone who cares whether the
people of this nation any longer have the power of self-rule." Linda Greenhouse, Gay
Rights Laws Can't Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. ThUES, May 21, 1996, at A20.
240. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
241. President Clinton's spokesperson, Mike McCurry, stated- "The President believes
today's decision was appropriate. The Colorado law denied a group of citizens the
right to participate effectively in the political process in Colorado, and the President
believes that's bad public policy." Joan Biskupic, Court Strikes Doum Colorado's Anti-
Gay Amendment, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at Al. Senator John Kerry from Massa-
chusetts said, "I hope that this final word will help to quash anti-gay initiatives in
some states and the anti-gay political pandering of some conservatives ... this re-
sults in violence against gay men and lesbians and is anti-American hate-mongering of
the worst order." Id. Representative Charles Canady expressed the following opposing
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and within the state of Colorado.' 2 Commentators described the
Court's decision as a "landmark victory for gay rights '  and one "writ-
ten with a generous tenor toward the legal rights of homosexuals."'
On the other hand, the negative emotion that the decision triggered
among others led to calls for the impeachment of the six Justices who
voted to uphold the lower court decision and even calls for revolu-
tion.'
While the complete impact of the Court's decision has yet to be deter-
mined, Romer will likely effect other cases pending before federal
courts.2 7 For example, in Nabozny v. Podlesny,' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that a young man who suffered from harassment
in school on the basis of his homosexual orientation had stated a valid
Equal Protection claim against the school district2m In addition, lower
viewpoint, stating, "Not only has the Court seriously undermined common notions of
democratic self-governance; it has done so in a manner that demeans and insults
adherents of the traditional Western understanding regarding homosexuality." Press
Release of Representative Charles Canady, Congressional Press Releases, Federal Doc-
ument Clearing House, May 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8787216.
242. Colorado Governor Roy Romer expressed his pleasure at the Court's decision
(Romer was named in the lawsuit in his official capacity despite his opposition to
Amendment 2) and stated that he would "do everything [he could] to get Colorado to
accept [the decision]." Greenhouse, supra note 239, at A20.
243. Savage, supra note 238, at Al.
244. Biskupic, supra note 241, at Al.
245. Dr. James Dobson, publisher of the newsletter and radio talk program Focus
on the Family, quoted conservative leader Paul Weyrich's statement, "Impeachment is
our only hope of bringing a court which is out of control under control." Charles
Levendosky, Religious Right Targets Justices for Impeachment Over Amendment 2,
DENVER POST, Oct. 16, 1996, at B7. The President of the National Legal Foundation,
Steven Fitschen, stated, "[Tihe 'Romer Six', the six Supreme Court [JIustices who
declared Amendment 2 unconstitutional, must be impeached." Id.
246. The Boston Herald editorial page stated:
The federal judiciary has become the most destructive institution in the land,
pulverizing ethics with a blow of its gavel The Republic could survive with-
out a Supreme Court. With the current court, it might not.
As they demolish democracy and encourage immorality, members of the Ken-
nedy crew should ponder a revolutionary manifesto that predates the Consti-
tution. It sets forth the people's right to "alter or abolish" any government
that becomes destructive of the ends for which this nation was founded.
Don Feder, High Court Wars on Ethical 7radition, BOSTON HERALD, May 24, 1996, at
25.
247. See Greenhouse, supra note 239, at A20. The Court's decision does not offer
any new rights for homosexuals and its impact on other cases is undetermined. Id. It
is "a constitutional shield rather than a sword." Id.
248. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
249. Id. at 460. The court explained it was "unable to garner any rational basis for
permitting one student to assault another based on the victim's sexual orientation."
Id. at 458. While the court explicitly stated that it was not relying on Romer, it con-
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courts are reviewing legislative acts similar to Colorado's Amendment 2
in light of the Supreme Court's decision.'
F. The Majority
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Romer and announced
that Colorado's Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause."'
Justice Kennedy began the opinion with a quotation from the dissent of
one of America's most well recognized Supreme Court decisions: "One
century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Con-
stitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'" Fol-
ceded that "[o]f course Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection
by the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans." Id. at 458 n.12. The Nabozny
case involved a man who alleged that while at school, students frequently tormented
him with taunts of "faggot" and physically abused him. Id. at 451. He also alleged
that he was humiliated when students performed a "mock rape" and urinated on him.
Id. at 451-52. Nabozny and his parents met frequently with school officials who
laughed, told them that -boys will be boys," and explained Nabozny should "expect"
these incidents if he was "going to be openly gay." Id. at 451. Nabozny eventually
settled the case with the school district for almost one million dollars. Terry Wilson,
Gay-Bashing Victim Awarded $1 MiUion for School Incident, CHL Ti., Nov. 21,
1996, at 12.
250. See, e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and following its decision in Romer,
vacated the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case for
further consideration. Id. Equality Foundation involved a voter-approved amendment
to the city charter of Cincinnati which would have had an effect similar to Amend-
ment 2. Michael Kirldand, Court Undermines Cincinnati Anti-Gay Law, BC CYCLE,
June 17, 1996. In his dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia stated that
unlike the Colorado case, which involved the state constitution, Equality Foundation
involved a determination at the "lowest electoral subunit" to disfavor gays and lesbi-
ans. Equality Found., 116 S. Ct. at 2519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996). The Court decided the case by a
vote of six-to-three with Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joining Justice Kennedy in the majority. Id. at 1623-29. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent-
ing opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Id. at 1629-
37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559) (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). It is interesting trivia that the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Plessy on May 18, 1896, almost exactly 100 years before the May 20, 1996, deci-
sion in Romer. See Pessy, 163 U.S. at 537. A quotation from a famous dissent send-
ing strong notions of justice for all Americans was presumably not unintentional. See
Chai Feldblum, Opinions Steeped in Moral Vision, CoNN. LAW. TRni., Aug. 5, 1996, at
14 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 748 U.S. 186 (1986) (five to four decision) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
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lowing this forceful opening quotation, Justice Kennedy described the
factual situation that brought Romer before the Court, including the
"contentious campaign" for passage of Amendment 2 and the city ordi-
nances that it was designed to repeal.20 He maintained that "Amend-
ment 2, in explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provi-
sions. It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level
of state or local government designed to protect the named class."'
The Court stated that it was invalidating Amendment 2, but "on a ratio-
nale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court. '
The Court's substantive analysis of Amendment 2 began by reviewing
the State of Colorado's principal argument in support of the
amendment's constitutionality.' Colorado maintained that Amendment
2's purpose was simply to deny homosexuals special rights. 7 The
Court relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of
Amendment 2 to declare that the State's "reading of the amendment's
language [was] implausible."' Further, the Court stated that "[t]he
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids
reinstatement of these laws and policies."'
The Court proceeded by describing the history, purpose, and operation
of legislation designed to prevent discrimination.' At common law, dis-
crimination was unlawful based upon a general duty owed by those en-
gaged in public employment."' The insufficiency of this common law
duty to combat discrimination gave rise to specific legislative acts de-
signed to protect particular persons from discrimination.' Colorado
followed this pattern by passing legislation which would protect persons
on the basis of "age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parent-
hood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental
disability... and, in recent times, sexual orientation."2 Amendment 2,
however, would eliminate sexual orientation as a protected group in both
private transactions and the public arena
The majority reasoned that "[ilt is a fair, if not necessary, inference"
253. Romer, 116 S. CL at 1623.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1624.
256. Id
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id at 1625.
260. Id. at 1625-26.
261. Id. at 1625.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1626.
264. Id.
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that laws of general applicability, designed to prevent things like arbi-
trary discrimination, may not be used by homosexuals as legal protec-
tion 2m During the decision-making process, an official, probably a
judge, must decide whether a person's sexual orientation is "arbitrary" as
understood by the statute. 8 This determination alone "would itself
amount to a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of homosexu-
ality" and thus violate Amendment 2.67 The Court stated that it did not
need to determine whether courts could enforce Colorado's laws of gen-
eral applicability to protect homosexuals because "the amendment im-
poses a special disability upon [homosexuals] alone."2W The Court not-
ed that only homosexuals were denied the protection of anti-
discrimination laws that "others enjoy or may seek without con-
straint."6
Next, the Court turned its attention to whether Amendment 2 denies
equal rights or special rights." In directly dismissing the special rights
rhetoric, the Court declared it found "nothing special in the protections
Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1627.
269. Id. The Court's entire opinion discusses homosexuals as members of an identi-
fiable class seemingly without any of the difficulty that other courts have faced. For
example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that homosexuals are an "uniden-
tifiable group or class of Individuals whose identity is defined by subjective and un-
apparent characteristics such as innate desires, drives, and thoughts. Those persons
having a homosexual 'orientation' simply do not, as such, comprise an identifiable
class" Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995), cert,
granted, 116 S. Ct 2519 (1996). Even Justice Scalia's dissent does not maintain that
homosexuals are not identifiable for purposes of Equal Protection analysis. See Ev-
ans, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scaa, J., dissenting) (arguing that the passage of Amend-
ment 2 was a rational decision by the voters of Colorado and consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause). Presumably, every member of the Court is aware that it
has declared other traits, such as illegitimacy and alienage, as having "unapparent
characteristics" which make them suspect classes subject to heightened Equal Protec-
tion analysis. See Amicus Brief of Human Rights Campaign Fund et al. at 11, Romer,
116 S. Ct. at 1620 (No. 94-1039). It is possible that Justice Scalia recognized the con-
tradiction in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in declaring that homosexuals are not identifi-
able for Equal Protection analysis but are sufficiently identifiable to enforce a statute
against them. See Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 261.
270. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Matt Coles, a leading gay rights advocate affiliated
with the American Civil Liberties Union, stated that the Court went "out of its way
to take on the 'special rights' rhetoric.' Greenhouse, supra note 239, at A20.
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most people either because they already have them or do not need
them. "2
Next, the Court reviewed the standards for determining when an Equal
Protection violation has occurred.' The Court stated that when no fun-
damental right is infringed and no suspect class is burdened,273 a law
will be upheld if it bears "a rational relation to some legitimate end." 4
Following its discussion of the law, the Court took issue with the suffi-
ciency of the traditional analysis as applied to Amendment 2.75 Accord-
ing to the majority, "Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conven-
tional inquiry.""8 The Court separated its analysis into two points that
are, in actuality, the same."77 First, Amendment 2 was a virtually
unprecented example of a direct violation of the words of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.s Because of its novelty and scope, Amendment 2 "con-
271. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Those who oppose the decision of the Court contin-
ue to maintain that Amendment 2 would have done nothing more than deny special
rights. David Frum, Suspect Jurisprudence, WiKLY. STANDARD, June 3, 1996, at 11
('Kennedy pounds away at the claim that gay rights are 'special rights.'"). Frum stat-
ed that Kennedy's position that "smokers, the short, the unathletic, and the bald" do
not need protection from discrimination may or may not be true. Id. This analysis
failed to recognize that Justice Kennedy also stated that under Amendment 2, all
groups, other than homosexuals, including smokers, the short, the unathletic, and the
bald, "may seek without constraint" legal protection from discrimination if the need
presents itself. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
272. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-28 (1996).
273. Id. The Court failed to declare homosexuals a suspect class despite the argu-
ment of some gay rights organizations that homosexuals qualify under the traditional
factors. See Amicus Brief of Human Rights Campaign Fund et al. at 30, Romer, 116
S. Ct. at 1620 (No. 94-1039). According to gay rights advocates, the traditional "warn-
ing signs," including a history of discrimination, political powerlessness, and immuta-
bility of a characteristic, apply to homosexuals. Id. at 5-25.
274. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
275. Id. at 1628.
276. Id. at 1627.
277. See id. at 1627-28.
278. Id. There is widespread agreement that the Court's first point adopts the ar-
gument presented by five constitutional scholars, including Harvard Law School Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe, through an amicus brief. See Greenhouse, supm note 239, at
A20; Feldblum, supra note 252, at 14. This amicus brief argues that Amendment 2
constituted a "per se" violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Amicus Brief of
Laurence Tribe et aL at 3, Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1620 (No. 94-1039). Professor Tribe
stated that discrimination is a wrong that the state can correct through the legal
process just as it corrects the wrong of criminal acts through the legal process. Id.
at 4-5. If the voters of Colorado excluded homosexuals from their laws protecting
citizens from criminal activity, such as physical assault, it would be easier to see
how the exclusion would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 5. Professor
Tribe argued that no state has a duty to provide a legal remedy for discrimination,
or even for a criminal wrong, but he maintained that the Equal Protection Clause
surely forbids a state from denying "even the possibility of protection under any state
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found[ed] this normal process of judicial review."' The Court conclud-
ed its first point by stating that Amendment 2 was "not within our consti-
tutional tradition" and that it imposed a "denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense."'
Before discussing its second point, the Court distinguished the fact
pattern in Romer, with an earlier polygamy case.2 1' In Davis v.
Beason,2' the Court upheld an Idaho statute barring polygamists and
advocates of polygamy from voting or holding office.' The Davis
Court determined that the law at issue only denied the right to vote to
those who had broken the law or "advocate[d] a practical resistance to
the [law].' 2s The Romer Court overruled Davis to the extent that it de-
nied the right to vote to those advocating a particular position; the Court
stated, however, that if Beason stood for the proposition that the state
may deny convicted felons the right to vote, it was "unexceptional."'
The Court held that if the Idaho statute punished persons because of
their "status," it would face the difficult challenge of overcoming a strict
scrutiny analysis-a "doubtful outcome."2'
or local law from a whole category of harmful conduct." Id. at 2. In arguing that
Amendment 2 constituted a "rare per se violation," Professor Tribe opined that the
Court may declare it unconstitutional without even entering the traditional analysis
regarding the nature of the rights affected and their rationality. Id. at 3-4. He argued
Amendment 2's "facial unconstitutionality flows directly from the plain meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's text." Id. at 4. Tribe maintained that this could explain why
"[niever since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment has this Court confronted
a measure quite like Amendment 2." Id. at 3.
279. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. The Court identified the fact that no similar case
had ever appeared before it as "itself instructive." Id. The majority reasoned,
"IDiscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.'" Id. (quoting
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
280. Id.
281. Id. Even though no party in Romer discussed the polygamy decision, the Court
mentioned it because it was "relied upon by the dissent" Id.
282. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
283. Id. at 341.
284. Id. at 347.
285. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. In his dissent, Justice Scala did not challenge these
conclusions. See id. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 1628. Justice Scalia's dissent spent a great deal. of time drawing an anal-
ogy between laws limiting the rights of polygamists and those limiting the rights of
homosexuals. See id, at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). After referring to several state
constitutions that forbid polygamy, Justice Scalia discussed the impact that these
statutes have on those who have a "polygamous 'orientation.'" Id. at 1635 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The characterization of a polygamous orientation as similar to a homosex-
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Next, the Court addressed the most controversial and debated issue of
the case.' The Court analyzed Amendment 2 using traditional Equal
Protection principles and found that no rational reason existed for treat-
ing homosexuals differently.' The Court stated that Colorado's ratio-
nale for Amendment 2, including protecting the freedom of association,
were "so far removed" from the "breadth of the Amendment" that "we
find it impossible to credit them."' The Court held that Amendment 2
was, in reality, "born of animosity."' The majority reasoned: "'[I]f the
ual orientation shows how the viewpoint of homosexuals has undergone little change
since the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. See Bowers v. Hardwick
478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (five to four decision) (Burger, J., concurring) (mentioning
Blackstone's description of homosexuality as a "heinous" and disgraceful act). Nota-
bly, the Court apparently disagreed with Justice Scala's belief that homosexuality
involves nothing more than the gender of the person with whom someone chooses to
have sexual relations. See Frwm, supra note 271, at 11 (arguing that the Court al-
ready views homosexuals as a suspect class). It is arguable that without saying as
much, the Court recognized the likelihood that homosexuality is an umnutable charac-
teristic, as other courts have done. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457 n.1O
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating that it "seem[s] dubious to suggest that someone would
choose to be homosexual, absent some genetic predisposition, given the considerable
discrimination leveled against homosexuals'). Black's legal dictionary describes polyga-
my as "more than one wife or husband at the same time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1159 (6th ed. 1990). While certain persons may have a genetic predisposition to more
than one sexual partner, no court has cited a study showing a genetic predisposition
to acquire more than one marriage license, as opposed to studies showing a predis-
position to homosexuality. See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern
Family, 45 CASE W. REs. L REV. 84, 159 n.247 (1994) (discussing five studies show-
ing a biological explanation for homosexuality). If the Court believes homosexuality is
a genetic phenomenon, unlike polygamy, the Court will likely find it more problemat-
ic to allow the government to treat homosexuals differently. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's disposition today suggests that these [anti-
polygamy] provisions are unconstitutional, and that polygamy must be permitted in
these States on a state-legislated, or perhaps even local-option, basis-unless, of
course, polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexu-
als.").
287. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
288. Id. at 1629. It is rare that a statute does not meet this low, rational basis
standard of review. But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
435 (1985) (holding that a city may not deny a special use permit to the mentally
retarded for operation of a group home because the denial was not rationally related
to a legitimate government interest). The Romer result has caused some to say that
the Court has "reinvigorate[d] rational-basis scrutiny.'" Marcia Coyle, Court: 'Animus'
in Colorado Gay Law, NATL LJ., June 3, 1996, at All (quoting Georgetown Universi-
ty Law Professor Chai R Feldblum). Indeed, this result is so rare that rational basis
review had been described as "'minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact,'" Martin Schwartz, Equal Protection Developments, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 17, 1996, at 3
(quoting Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Forwardk In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court A Model of Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
289. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
290. Id. at 1628. The Court's position that animosity motivated the enactment of
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constitutional conception of equal protection of the laws means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est."' The Court held that the damage done to homosexuals in Colo-
rado would "outrun and belie" any legitimate purpose behind Amend-
ment 2.' The Court used forceful language to support its decision; spe-
cifically, that the classification undertaken in Colorado was done "for its
own sake,"' which was "'obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment"s Finally, the Court concluded that Amendment 2
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
"classiflying] homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to
make them unequal to everyone else.... A State cannot so deem a class
of persons a stranger to its laws.'
G. The Dissent
Justice Scalia began his dissent by stating that the Court had confused
a culture war for a "fit of spite."' The dissent then asserted that Colo-
rado voters did not enact Amendment 2 out of animus toward homosexu-
als, but to "preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through the use of the
laws.' Justice Scalia attacked the majority's position and opined that
the decision supports the proposition that "opposition to homosexuality
is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.' Justice Scala's intro-
duction concluded by mentioning a topic found throughout his dis-
Amendment 2 drew harsh criticism from some, including Justice Scalia. Id. at 1636
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Stuart Taylor, Games Justices Pay, RECORDER, May 29, 1996,
at 4 (stating that the Court's opinion contained "slurs tarring the votes [sic] of Colo-
rado as bigots*).
291. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
292. Id. at 1629.
293. Id.
294. Id. (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
295. Id.
296. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined
the dissent Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Jeremy Rabin, The Supreme Court in
the Culture Wars, PuB. Wmmsr, Fall 1996, at 3-26 (discussing the origin of the Ger-
man term "Kulturkamp" and its application to American culture wars).
297. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sent-that the majority opinion reflects the bias of "the elite class from
which the Members of this institution are selected.""
In Part I of his dissent, Justice Scalia attacked the Court's position that
Amendment 2 placed homosexuals in a less favorable position than be-
fore; rather, according to Justice Scalia, the amendment made them equal
with other citizens.' The dissent asserted that, contrary to the
majority's reasoning, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that Amend-
ment 2 would not deny gays and lesbians the protection of laws of gener-
al applicability."° As support for his contention, Justice Scalia pointed
to a footnote in the lower court opinion contending that the intent of
Amendment 2 was not to impact laws of general applicability.' After
discounting the possibility of courts denying homosexuals relief under
laws of general applicability, Justice Scalia opined that the "[a]mendment
prohibits special treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more." '
Justice Scalia asserted that the Court's opinion created an Equal Pro-
tection violation every time a state makes it more difficult for one group
to change state law than any other group.'  The dissent continued by
outlining several examples of the need for one group of citizens to
change a law at one level of government (e.g., the state level), while
another group of citizens changes the law at a different level (e.g., the
local level).' Justice Scalia argued that if this type of situation gave
rise to an Equal Protection violation, then the law had achieved "terminal
299. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). This type of attack on members of the Court has
caused some to characterize Scala's style as insulting and bombastic. See James
Kunen, One Angry Man, TIME, July 8, 1996, at 48-49. Justice Scalia does not explain
how he was able to avoid becoming a member of the elite class while attending
Georgetown, the University of Chicago, and Harvard. Id. Indeed, Justice Scalia's
sometimes personal insults leveled at his fellow Justices have left some, notably Jus-
tice O'Connor, quite angry at his style. David Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y.
TamES, Oct. 6, 1996, § 6, at 68-69. Justice Scalia has even turned his sharp rhetoric
on those with whom he is regularly in agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia,
116 S. Ct. 2264, 2305 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In United States v. Virginia,
Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Virginia Military Institute should have read
earlier Court cases and understood that their institution was in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia responded,
"Any lawyer who gave that advice to the Commonwealth [of Virginia] ought to have
been either disbarred or committed." Id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
300. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 1629-30 (Scaia, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia may have given too much
weight to one ambiguous sentence in a footnote of the lower court's opinion. See
Feldblum, supra note 252, at 14.
303. Romer, 116 S. CL at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 1630-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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silliness."" He acknowledged that the Court might find a rational rea-
son for allowing the government to treat groups differently in his exam-
ples, but continued to express his shock that the Court could not find
such a rational reason for Amendment 2.'
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Scalia discussed Bowers v.
Hardwick." Justice Scalia began by chastising the Court for not men-
tioning Bowers in its opinion' He maintained that if it was "constitu-
tionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws
merely disfavoring homosexual conduct"31° The dissent argued that
Amendment 2 was not as damaging to homosexuals as the ban on sod-
omy because sodomy "'defines the class.'""' Justice Scalia challenged
Respondents' position that Bowers was not controlling because some
homosexuals do not engage in homosexual sodomy."2 Quoting the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which found it "virtually impossible to
distinguish or separate individuals of a particular orientation which pre-
disposes them toward a particular sexual conduct from those who actu-
ally engage in that particular type of sexual conduct,'" Justice Scalia dis-
counted Respondents' position." ' The dissent argued that if it is ratio-
nal to criminalize the conduct, it is surely rational to deny "special favor
and protection" for those 'who desire to engage in the criminal con-
306. Id. at 1630 (Scala, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308. Id, (Sca4s, J., dissenting) at 1631; Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
309. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
310. Id. (Sca, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia's reading of
Bowers as declaring it constitutional to outlaw homosexual conduct is misleading. See
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (upholding the constitutionality of limiting homosexual sod-
omy). Homosexuals engage in other activities with members of the same sex, such as
kissing and hand holding, which are certainly homosexual conduct, although not dis-
cussed in Bowers. See Feldblum, supra note 252, at 63 (arguing that sodomy does
not "define" homosexuals).
311. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 103 (1987)).
312. Id. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313. Id. (Scaa, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting Equality Found. v. City of Cin-
cinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996)).
Ironically, the quotation provided by Justice Scalia came from a case since vacated
by the Supreme Court. See Equality Found., 116 S. Ct. at 2519. In addition, if the
Amendment treats homosexuals differently based upon status, the constitutional analy-
sis becomes even more difficult Cf. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (discussing the appli-
cability of the strict scrutiny doctrine when treating classes of persons differently
based upon status).
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duct."' Even if the classification is "'imperfect,'" the dissent reasoned,
that does not make the law regulating that class of persons a violation of
Equal Protection.15
In Part U of the dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that Amendment 2
was not a result of public hostility toward homosexuals, as the majority
claimed."1 Justice Scalia assaulted the majority's position which
"contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans have been guilty of
'animus' or 'animosity' toward homosexuality, as though that has been
established as Unamerican. " i' Justice Scalia maintained, however, that
it is acceptable to disapprove of certain conduct, for example, murder or
animal cruelty."'8 He stated that Amendment 2 did not reflect any desire
to harm homosexuals and that the majority's "portrayal of Coloradans as
a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled 'gay-bashing' is so false as
to be comical.""9 To support his contention that Coloradans were not
motivated by animus, Justice Scalia pointed out that Colorado repealed
its statute banning same-sex sodomy, although he noted that this did not
mean they had abandoned their view that homosexuality is wrong.'s
Justice Scalia asserted that although Colorado eliminated a ban on homo-
314. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's arguments
concerning Bowers may demonstrate that the Court has done damage to the sodomy
precedent with its ruling in Romer. Coyle, supra note 288, at All. Notre Dame Law
Professor Douglas Kmiec stated, i[TIhe majority has overruled Bowers sub silentio.'"
Richard C. Reuben, Gay Rights Watershed?, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 30 (quoting Notre
Dame Law Professor Douglas Kmiec). Because the Court decided Bowers on Due
Process grounds, and Romer v. Evans was decided on Equal Protection grounds,
there is a distinction between the two cases. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186 (hold-
ing homosexual sodomy not protected by the Due Process clause), with Romer, 116
S. Ct. at 1620 (holding that public animus is not a legitimate government interest for
Equal Protection purposes). Of course, Bowers was extremely controversial at the
time it was decided by a five-to-four vote, and caused retired Justice Lewis Powell to
state that he had made a mistake by voting with the majority. Bowers, 478 U.S. at
186; JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUS7iCE LEwis F. PowEnu JR. 530 (1994).
315. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
316. Id. at 1633.36 (Scali, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also maintained that America's
"moral heritage" should not allow Americans to "hate any human being or class of
human beings." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (Scalia J., dissenting). This assertion further illustrates Justice ScalIa's belief
that homosexuality is not a biological orientation, but rather conduct similar to other
types of nonbiological behavior, like murder or cruelty to animals. See supra note
286 and accompanying text (discussing the potential biological explanation for homo-
sexual orientation).
319. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's acknowledgement that Colorado does
not have a law banning homosexual sodomy is at odds with his earlier reliance upon
Bowers to support Amendment 2. See id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sexual sodomy from its criminal code, the Court must acknowledge that
moral objections to homosexuality remain." According to the dissent,
those who disapprove of homosexuality have difficulty opposing homo-
sexual agendas because homosexuals tend to live in greater concentra-
tion in certain communities, have high disposable incomes, and care
deeply about issues of concern to homosexuals.' 2 The dissent empha-
sized that homosexuals had gained political clout in several cities in
Colorado,s these events had thus led the voters of Colorado to decide
whether to protect homosexuals from discrimination in a statewide,
single-issue format.M
In concluding Part El of the dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the Court
for not relying upon any case law in reaching its conclusion that Amend-
ment 2 must be unconstitutional because no similar legislation had ever
been enacted.'
Justice Scalia began Part IV of his dissent by analogizing Amendment 2
to regulations against polygamy.' The dissent then challenged the
Court's alleged improper participation in a cultural war and engaged in a
mixture of criticism of the Court's legal judgment and disdain for the
"lawyer class."w Justice Scalia stated, "I think it is no business of the
courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture
war.' Justice Scalia accused the Court of developing a "novel and ex-
321. Id. at 1633-4 (Scala, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 1634 (Scaa, J., dissenting).
323. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324. Id. (Scal*, J., dissenting).
325. Id. (Scalla, J., dissenting). A conflict exists between criticizing the majority for
not citing any case law (even if one accepts this questionable criticism) and ac-
knowledging that legislation like Amendment 2 had never before presented itself
Justice Scalia's contention that a rational reason exists forl Amendment 2 simply be-
cause states have regulated homosexuality before and homosexuality remains morally
objectionable to some is every bit as "facially absurd" as any position taken by the
majority. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, no connection has ever been
supported, or even asserted, as to how protecting homosexuals from discrimination in
employment and housing fosters the "piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality
favored by a majority of Coloradans." See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia's dissent completely ignores any evidence which may exist to show that a
person's legal status with regard to employment or housing makes him or her more
or less likely to subscribe to traditional sexual morality.
326. Id. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 286 (discussing the dissent's
polygamy analogy).
327. Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One can argue that the dissent has taken a
side in this conflict just 'as much as the majority. See Feldblum, supra note 252, at
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travagant constitutional doctrine to take victory away from traditional
forces." 9
Justice Scalia asserted that the Court's decision was "insulting" to the
voters of Colorado and described homosexuals as an influential minority
in media and politics.' The dissent explained that the Court is sympa-
thetic to homosexuals because they express "the views and values of the
lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn."" According
to the dissent, these views and values are evident in the Bylaws of the
Association of American Law Schools which require campus recruiters to
pledge that they are willing to hire homosexuals.' Justice Scalia ob-
14 ("How else did he decide whether Amendment 2 was, or was not, motivated sole-
ly by inappropriate 'animus' toward a targeted group?"). The dissent could only up-
hold Amendment 2 by accepting the belief that the state supports sexual morality by
preventing homosexuals from achieving redress from discrimination. Id. ('It is a deci-
sion profoundly based on morality on the part of the judge .... ").
329. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Many outside the Court have
made the assertion that the majority's action in strikdng Amendment 2 was particular-
ly political because the amendment was adopted by a vote of the people of Colora-
do. See Douglas W. Kmiec, When the Federal Judiciary Gets in the Way, CHL TRIB.,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 19. One commentator even called the Supreme Court a "spoiled
teenager" for reversing political referendums. Id. ("Coloradans thought this troubling
issue best resolved outside government, where moral and religious teaching could
distinguish hateful discrimination from decisions reasonably aimed at not affirming a
sexual practice antagonistic to culture and family."). Adopting this line of reasoning
could result in the enforcement of measures which many, including six Justices of
the United States Supreme Court, believe to be unconstitutional, simply because a
nuijority of the voters think it is wise. Indeed, Justice Scalia did not have difficulty
reversing the will of the elected representatives of the people, presumably operating
within the political framework, when he voted to declare federal affirmative action
programs unconstitutional. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097,
2118-19 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing failure of government contract pro-
grams which give preference to minorities to survive strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause). Commentators have taken this red herring argument to its absurd
conclusion by arguing that if the Justices are "free to legislate their preferences,"
they should be forced to run for office. Mona Charen, Voters Should Pick Justices,
DAYTON DAILY NEws, June 1, 1996, at All. By describing the result in Romer as "an
unconscionable usurpation of power that rightly belongs to you and me," commenta-
tors instruct the Justices to abdicate their role as interpreters of the Constitution and
allow the voters themselves to judge when the state stymies its guarantees. See id.
330. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
331. Id. (Scai J., dissenting).
332. Id. (Scalia J., dissenting). The Dean of Students at Boalt Hall School of Law
responded to Justice Scalia by saying,
The notion that we're an elite group of people who are out of touch with
the mass of society is unjustified. The association was out front in refusing
to let schools discriminate on the basis of sex, too. It's appropriate that law
schools take principled positions on things like that.
Mike McKee, Scalia's Dissent Dismay's Law Schools, RECORDER, May 28, 1996, at 5
(quoting Leslie Oster, Dean of Student Affairs).
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served that employers can refuse to hire a person based upon a multi-
tude of factors, but not homosexuality."
The dissent summarized by asserting that the majority "opinion has no
foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends to."'
In conclusion, Justice Scalia stated that upholding the lower court ruling
was "an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will.""
V. IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME CouRT's DECISION ON
THE CONSTITImONALITY OF AMENDMENT 2.
A. The Supreme Court Decision Will Prevent Government
Endorsement of Discrimination Against Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals,
and Others.
Fundamentalist Christian organizations, many with ties to political
activist and televangelist Pat Robertson, were the primary advocates of
Amendment 2.' Although documents submitted to the Supreme Court
333. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "These are protections taken
for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need
them .... " Id. at 1627. Following this logic would result in the conclusion that
there has been insufficient evidence of discrimination against Republicans, snail-eaters,
and Chicago Cubs fans to warrant protection, thus they do not need
antidiscrimination laws. See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Unlike homosexuals
affected by Amendment 2, however, these groups would be free to organize and peti-
tion their elected representatives for redress. See id, at 1628 (stating "It is not within
our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.").
334. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia continues to assert that the decision in
Romer was a political act. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264, 2308 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But it is one of the unhappy incidents of the federal system
that a self-righteous Supreme Court, acting on its Members' personal views of what
would make a 'more perfect Union' can impose its own favored social and economic
dispositions nationwide."); Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct 2342, 2373 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("While the present Court sits, a major, undemocratic restruc-
turing of our national institutions and mores is constantly in progress."). Virginia,
116 S. Ct. at 2308 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
336. See Batterman, supra note 6, at 940 n.181. Over the past decade, 53 fundamen-
talist organizations moved their headquarters to Colorado Springs, Colorado. Id. at
939. These organizations have income which exceeds $357 million and they employ a
significant number of people. Id. This substantial presence in Colorado Springs has
increased the influence of fundamentalist groups in the area, particularly Colorado for
Family Values. Id. at 939-40. While CFV claimed that they were only interested in the
passage of Amendment 2, they have yet to disband as promised, and they have be-
come involved in other fundmanentalist causes in Colorado. Id. at 940.
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on behalf of supporters of Amendment 2 presented arguably credible
reasons for supporting the Amendment, including protecting limited state
resources,'" much of their public rhetoric was inflammatory and hate-
ful.' For example, Colorado for Family Values (CFV) and other groups
argued that homosexuals were child molesters' who filled up the
hospitals with AIDS patients, increased insurance rates, and, if allowed
to marry, would produce "wretched victim[]" children.1 While many
Coloradans likely did not have these hateful purposes in mind when
voting for Amendment 2,' the rhetoric of the vocal and active support-
ers exemplifies the true intentions of those whose efforts were instru-
mental in passing Amendment 2.' If Amendment 2 had been upheld, it
is reasonable to believe that the voices of those who hate homosexual
men and women would have been empowered and therefore become
louder. Public discourse of this nature leads directly to threats, vandal-
ism, battery, and murder.' While this does not relate to the constitu-
tionality of Amendment 2, it is the reality in which many homosexuals
live.
Some supporters of Amendment 2 have attempted to portray those
who object to the bigoted, yet effective, rhetoric of these anti-gay organi-
zations as people who seek "to stigmatize, marginalize, and silence reli-
gious traditionalists, and to fence them out from authentic participation
in the economic and social life of the community."S" It strains logic to
understand how Amendment 2 supporters can consider resisting an at-
tempt, driven primarily by religious fundamentalists, to deprive gays and
lesbians of civil rights protection by publicizing the fundamentalists'
337. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 14-17, Romer (No. 94-1039).
338. See Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 848.
339. In fact, mental health professionals maintain that homosexuals are no more
likely to be child molesters than heterosexuals. Id at 850 n.69.
340. Id. at 848 (quoting Answer Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 10-11), Romer (No.
94-1039).
341. "the record demonstrate[d] that Coloradans are largely tolerant of homosexuali-
ty. . . ." Reply Brief for Petitioners at 15, Romer (No. 94-1039).
342. Some have argued that proponents of Amendment 2 used scare tactics to dis-
guise the implications of the amendment. See Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 849 n.63.
This rhetoric went to the extreme of arguing that homosexuals often have had sex
with 1000 partners, and that they enjoy ingesting urine and feces as a part of their
sexual routine. Batterman, supra note 6, at 938 nrL166-68.
343. See Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 852 & nn.82-86. "(A] Colorado Springs psy-
chotherapist who had a bumper sticker on her car that read 'Celebrate Diversity,'
was knocked unconscious, had crosses cut into her hands, and had her office spray-
painted with the words 'Stop Evil' and 'Seek God." Batterman, supra note 6, at 936
n.187 (citing Paul McEnroe, Violence Is Apparent Fallout of Colorado Law on Gays,
STAR TRm., Jan. 25, 1993, at 1A).
344. Duncan & Young, supra note 22, at 126.
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quotations an attempt to "stigmatize" the supporters.34 5 This
mischaracterization of the views of Amendment 2's opponents also en-
tails the idea that, "the effect of Amendment 2 and similar grassroots
initiatives is not to stigmatize and harm homosexuals, but rather to re-
move the stigma and associated harms inflicted on traditional believers
by state and local homosexual rights legislation.""6 Upholding
Amendment 2 would undoubtedly have mobilized voices such as these
and continued the assault on civil rights protection for gays and lesbians
around the country. 7
Homosexuals would not have been the only people affected by the
enactment of Amendment 2, because homosexuality is not a characteris-
tic which, like race or gender, is easily perceived.' This concern led to
pointed questioning by the Justices during the oral argument of the Solic-
itor General of Colorado, Timothy M. Tymkovich, as to exactly who
would fall into the classification created by Amendment 2.' For exam-
ple: "[H]ow do you interpret the bisexual orientation language, homosex-
ual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation? Does that require any conduct, or is
it just a disposition?' ° Although the Court considered this question a
serious one, it went unanswered during oral argument"51 The question
of who is a homosexual is a relatively new question because "homosexu-
al" is a relatively new tern.
Absent a clear-cut answer to this question, the potential for discrimina-
tion against persons against whom discrimination is not intended is a
possibility.' Therefore, because of the difficulty of identifying homo-
345. See Batterman, supna note 6, at 938 n.168.
346. Duncan & Young, supra note 22, at 129.
347. See Batterman, supra note 6, at 916 nn.7 & 9.
348. Id. at 95962.
349. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No.
94-1039), avaiiable in 1995 WL 605822, at *3-30 (Oct. 10, 1995).
350. Id. at *8-9. After some give-and-take between the Solicitor General and the
Justices in which the State indicated that conduct would be the best way to define
homosexual, bisexual, and lesbian orientation, a Justice asked: "Well, is it the sole
indicator? Are you representing to this Court that Colorado's position is that the class
defining characteristic is conduct as opposed to preference or proclivity or whatnot?"
Id. at *10.
351. The Solicitor General described the question as "immaterial" to the issue before
the Court. Id. at *10.
352. Batterman, supra note 6, at 960. The term "homosexual" was first used in 1869
in a German pamphlet. Id.
353. Even the leadership of CFV conceded that identifying a homosexual by appear-
ance is difficult Id. at 971.
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sexuals based upon appearance and superficially obvious characteristics
that many associate with homosexuality,u the amendment could have
subjected heterosexuals to various forms of discrimination because of an
assumption that they were homosexual. Discrimination against hetero-
sexual persons who are suspected homosexuals could occur if a hetero-
sexual were reading literature published by a gay organization in public,
attending a gay rights event, or even simply associating with gay or lesbi-
an friends.m This potential for discrimination under Amendment 2
against suspected homosexuals would have created an environment of
suspicion and fear resulting in hardship or tragedy for homosexuals and
heterosexuals alike.
B. The Court's Decision Ensures that Homosexuals Will Not Be Shut
Out of the Political Process.
"[N]o citizen has been disenfranchised, prevented from casting an
equally weighted vote, or in any way hindered in electing the representa-
tive of his or her choice by Amendment 2 ." ' Supporters of Amend-
ment 2 were fond of noting that the amendment did not inhibit the right
of homosexuals to vote, thus implying that voting is the only definition
of the "political process." 7 The political process, however, is more
than voting-it also includes the equal chance to receive legislation
which protects the interests of those who desire it It seems the very
purpose behind Amendment 2 was to shut homosexuals out of the halls
of power in Colorado; otherwise, Amendment 2's supporters would have
been content to allow the people's representatives to decide this issue,
just as they decide other civil rights issues in the state." Therefore, the
354. Many view effeminacy as an indication that a man is homosexual Id. at 970-
72. Similarly, society often perceives masculine women as lesbians. Id. at 970 n.435.
While sometimes, perhaps even with disproportionate frequency, these characteristics
are present in gay and lesbian persons, it is also reasonable to assume that many
heterosexuals display similar characteristics. AL at 970-74.
355. Id. at 972-74.
356. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (No. 94-1039).
357. See Duncan & Young, supra note 22, at 109-11.
358. See generaliy Batternan, supra note 6, at 943-46 (discussing the importance of
using the legislative process as a protective mechanism).
359. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 n.28 (Colo. 1993).
While the State is quite right that the plaintiff class, like any other members
of society, has no right to successful participation in the political process,
the fact remains that its unsuccessful participation is mandated by the provi-
sions of Amendment 2. In contrast to all other members of the electorate
whose successful or unsuccessful participation in the process cannot be de-
termined until ballots, votes, charters, etc., have been counted or voted upon,
with the exception of a state constitutional amendment, gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals are told that you can appeal to government on those issues of
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primary purpose of Amendment 2 was to dilute the influence of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals in the political arena.' The decision of the
United States Supreme Court ensured that homosexuals will be free to
participate in the political process and exercise their civic right to peti-
tion their elected representatives for relief."
C. Upholding Amendment 2 Would Not Have Granted "Special Rights"
to Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals.
In the debate over Amendment 2, supporters often stated that they
were simply trying to prevent any group from getting special rights over
any other group. 2 Groups have used this special rights language to op-
pose other pieces of landmark civil rights legislation, including the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.30 The logical flip-side to the special rights argument
is that allowing gays and lesbians the right to equal treatment infringes
upon the right to discriminate by those who disapprove of homosexu-
als.' The argument that people should have the right to discriminate,
concern to you, but you will, by virtue of Amendment 2, lose-irrespective of
your ability to summon the support of others, or carry a majority in an elec-
tion.'
Id.
360. During oral arguments, one Justice said, "Usually when we have an equal pro-
tection question we measure the objective of the legislature against the class that is
adopted, against the statutory classification. Here, the classification seems to be
adopted for its own sake. rve never seen a case like this." Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available in 1995 WL
605822, at *4 (Oct. 10, 1995). Another Justice said, "I mean, the literal language
would indicate that, for example, a public library could refuse to allow books to be
borrowed by homosexuals and there would be no relief." Id,
361. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
362. Petitioners argued that the objective of Amendment 2 was to "immunize from
preemption special protections that have been conferred upon homosexuals and bisex-
uals." Transcript of Oral Argument, Romer (No. 94-1039), available in 1995 WL
605822, at *10 (Oct 10, 1995). Although the text of the amendment states that only
gay, lesbian, and bisexuals may not be protected by ordinance and statute, the ordi-
nances and statutes granting this protection to homosexuals refer to "sexual orienta-
tion" in general. See Grauerholz, supra note 72, at 853. Therefore, the effect of
Amendment 2 apparently would have been to allow discrimination on the basis of
homosexuality without eliminating a cause of action for discrimination by heterosexu-
als.
363. Marcosson, supra note 65, at 144-62.
364. See Duncan & Young, supra note 22, at 116-18. Duncan and Young reasoned
that "gay, lesbians, and bisexuals were discouraged by Amendment Two, because it
made their desire to regulate the businesses and properties of others--through restric-
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however, is ilogical.m Whether homosexuals deserve protection from
discrimination involves issues of genetics, morality, upbringing, and reli-
gion which are beyond the scope of this Note, but the concept that ir-
rational discrimination is wrong is an ideal to which Americans have long
subscribed.' During oral argument of Romer, a Justice asked the Solic-
itor General of Colorado: "[H]aving the right not to be refused a job or to
rent on that ground is a special right. ... It's not being just like every-
body else?" 7 It seems irrational to state that a person who is subject
to discrimination is somehow seeking special rights when they seek the
same opportunities which other groups already enjoy but do not need
legislation to ensure. If accepted by society, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to directly attack the special rights language in striking Amendment
2 will eliminate this red herring from future debates over civil liber-
ties.'
D. The Future
The legal ramifications of the Court's decision in Romer remain un-
clear. Future decisions may show that the Court has adopted a new "per
se" violation of the Equal Protection Clause and will apply the new doc-
trine only in circumstances where the facts parallel those presented in
the fight over Amendment 2.1 It is equally plausible that the Court's
concern for the political equality of homosexuals caused them to be
more skeptical of any justifications offered by the State, but this concern
will not provide relief for other types of regulations affecting homosex-
uals.' Romer could also demonstrate that the Court has, without say-
ing as much, granted homosexuals a form of heightened scrutiny.37
tive 'gay rights' laws-more difficult to accomplish." Id. at 116.
365. Even CFV conceded that although special rights may be a good campaign slo-
gan, it is an insufficient legal argument. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285-86
n.28 (Colo. 1993).
366. See Marcosson, supra note 65, at 155-56. In an attempt to break a Senate fil-
ibuster of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Hubert Humphrey argued that the
right to (1) not be denied a job on a basis other than merit, and, (2) find a place to
sleep at night are not special, but fundamental rights which all citizens should enjoy.
Id.
367. Transcript of Oral Argument, Romer (No. 94-1039), available in 1995 WL
605822, at *19 (Oct. 10, 1995).
368. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct 1620, 1625-27 (1996) (arguing that antidiscrimi-
nation laws do not grant special rights).
369. See Amicus Brief of Tribe et al. at *3, Romer (No. 94-1039) (advocating the
adoption of a per se Equal Protection violation theory).
370. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalla, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
made primarily a political decision).
371. See Frum, supra note 271, at 11 (arguing that homosexuals are already being
treated similar to a suspect class); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
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If it is shown that the Court has granted homosexuals a form a height-
ened scrutiny, the implications for future sodomy, marriage, and military
cases could be extensive and far reaching. The only certainty is that
measures designed to make it impossible for homosexuals to seek relief
from discrimination through their elected representatives are dead.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of whether homosexuals are protected in any way by the
Equal Protection Clause has now been answered by the United States
Supreme CourL The debate over gays in the military, same-sex marriag-
es, and gay rights protections has been littered with fear, hatred, and, in
some cases, violence. In many respects the debate over equal rights for
homosexuals is the final battle between those who would use govern-
ment to further their religious beliefs and those who believe that the
government should guarantee to every citizen the right to live free of
government-endorsed discrimination. The Supreme Court seized an op-
portunity and exercised its historical role by protecting those who, to
some in American society, were not entitled to equal treatment. The tide
of history is obvious: If the Supreme Court had decided against those
attempting to ensure freedom for homosexual citizens, the country
would have no doubt looked over its shoulder with regret
"Therefore let us stop passing judgment on one another. Instead, make up your
mind not to put any obstacle or stumbling block in your brother's way."m
GARY ALAN CoLs
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that a city may not deny a special use permit to the
mentally retarded for operation of a group home because the classification is not
sufficiently related to government interest).
372. See Marty Trillhaase, ICA Drops Anti-Gay Initiative Bid, IDAHO STATESMAN,
July 2, 1996, at Al; Oregon Anti-Gay Vote Delayed Until 1998, Cm. TRi., June 7,
1996, at N3 (reporting that Oregon would not put anti-gay initiative on the 1996 bal-
lot due to likely unconstitutionality).
373. Romans 14:13.
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